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An Integrated Model of Ethical Capital
and Relational Wealth of the Firm
Bradley D. Goronson
Brigham Young University

ABSTRACT: Key sources of competitive advantage for a firm include its various
forms of relational wealth. These intangible relational assets exist because of a firm’s
relationship with a given stakeholder. We argue that stakeholder perceptions of the
morality of a firm can have substantive positive or negative effects on that firm’s
relational wealth. Previous research has suggested links between perceptions of the
morality of a firm held by stakeholders such as employees, strategic alliance partners,
customers, and communities and the relevant relational wealth held by the firm in relation
to those stakeholders. However, a comprehensive model and composite measure of these
ethical perceptions and their relationship with relational wealth does not exist in the
academic literature. The lack of such a model and measure impedes academic research on
the link between ethics and competitive advantage and also limits the extent to which
these important antecedents of relational wealth are considered in firm valuation and
investment decision making. Ethical capital is the collection of stakeholder perceptions
relating to a firm’s underlying moral character which can be converted into relational
wealth. We propose an integrative, general model of ethical capital of the firm in which
positive stakeholder perceptions of the moral character of a firm lead to high value
behaviors while negative perceptions lead to value reducing behaviors. We differentiate
our conceptualization from existing constructs, namely reputation capital and social
capital. We describe ethical capital with employees, strategic alliance partners,
consumers, and communities. We then conclude by outlining a plan for
operationalization of ethical capital across stakeholders in light of our model.
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In the “interim struggle” (Weick, 1995) to understand how a firm’s intangible
resources influence firm performance and valuation, many scholars have argued that
perceptions held by stakeholders matter a great deal. As firms and stakeholders interact
with one another, unwritten expectations and subjective, implicit conceptualizations of
what constitutes proper behavior, fairness, justice, etc. in the relationship develop
(Rousseau, 1989). It’s intuitive that stakeholders prefer firms to interact with them in
ways that they (i.e. the stakeholders) find acceptable. An important theoretical and
empirical question is whether or not catering to these moral preferences will provide
firms with competitive advantages.
We note a pattern across separate literatures consistently suggesting that
perceptions of the morality of a firm held by stakeholders affect the firm’s relational
wealth (Business Ethics Quarterly, 2002). Theoretical and empirical work has suggested
links between ethics based perceptions of firms held by employees and forms of
relational wealth related to employees such as organizational commitment (Cullen &
Victor, 1993; Caldwell & Hansen, 2010) and value producing employee behaviors (e.g.
extra-role behavior; see Caldwell & Hansen, 2010; Raile, 2012). Strategy scholars have
consistently argued and found empirical evidence that perceptions of trustworthiness
within strategic alliances are associated with competitive advantage (Dyer & Singh,
1998; Barney & Hansen, 1994). Research at the intersection between marketing and
business ethics has also demonstrated a link between consumers’ perceptions of an
ethical brand and the equity of that brand (Iglesias et al., 2019; Sierra et al., 2017). In
addition, sociologists have studied organizational legitimacy, including moral legitimacy
(Suchman, 1995), within communities. Such legitimacy depends on perceptions of the
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firm’s “essence” (i.e. its character and structure) as well as moral evaluations of its
actions and constitutes a form of relational wealth valuable to the firm.
Organizational trust scholars have argued that a primary antecedent of trust is
perceived integrity of the trustee, that is, the extent to which the trustor believes a “trustee
adheres to a set of principles that the trustor finds acceptable” (Mayer et al., 1995: 719).
Those standards which a stakeholder uses to judge the acceptability or appropriateness
(Suchman, 1995) of the principles manifested by a firm is derived from a moral
psychological contract (Rousseau, 1989) of expectations held by the stakeholder in
relation to the firm. Acknowledging this fact, other theoretical work on stakeholder
perceptions of the firm and its actions has argued that firm behavior is evaluated
subjectively by stakeholders through their own idiosyncratic set of values or “mediating
lens” (Godfrey, 2005; Caldwell & Hansen, 2010).
When stakeholders receive signals of a firm’s integrity, such as indirect exposure
to the firm’s reputation (Fombrun, 1995) or direct experience of its behavior, they
evaluate these signals through their mediating lens of values. When evaluated positively,
these signals and evaluations translate into stronger perceptions that the firm has and will
adhere to moral principles that are acceptable, in other words, stronger perceptions of the
integrity factor of trustworthiness as defined in Mayer et al. (1995). These perceptions of
trustworthiness increase the trust a stakeholder has in the firm. Conversely, negatively
evaluated signals will weaken perceptions of integrity and decrease stakeholder trust in
the firm. Similar to what Barney and Hansen (1994) call strong-form trust, a trustor gains
an assurance that the trustee won’t act inconsistent with these principles because it would
be very personally, rather than simply economically, costly to do so. When stakeholders
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perceive a firm and its actions in this way, it leads to behaviors that are valuable to the
firm (Caldwell & Hansen, 2010), and increases or insures (Godfrey, 2005) relational
wealth against damage if an ethical failure should occur.
We believe that any attempt to understand competitive advantage and the value of
a firm requires consideration of how the firm is perceived by stakeholders and the effect
of these perceptions have on relational wealth. As already mentioned, there has been
much exemplary scholarship done on this topic. However, this work has not been
synthesized into a general model across different stakeholders, nor has a composite
measure of these perceptions across stakeholders been developed and the relationship
between these perceptions and relational wealth more fully explicated. Both academic
research in this area and practitioner activities such as firm valuation and investment
decision making are impeded by the lack of such a model and measure. We propose a
model in which stakeholder perceptions of the integrity factor of trustworthiness (Mayer
et al., 1995) are a valuable relational asset that operates as a form of capital which can be
accumulated and converted to increase or preserve relational wealth. We name these
stakeholder perceptions of the underlying moral character (Godfrey, 2005) of a firm
which are converted (Bourdieu, 1985) into relational wealth ethical capital. The
conversion of these perceptions into relational wealth occurs in two main ways:
generating insurance for other forms of relational wealth (Godfrey, 2005) or resulting in
high-value stakeholder behaviors (Caldwell & Hansen, 2010) which represents an
increase in relational wealth.
This paper has two purposes. First, to synthesize extant research on stakeholder
perceptions of firm trustworthiness and moral acceptability and the relationship these
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perceptions have with relational wealth into a general model of ethical capital. Second, to
outline a strategy for operationalizing ethical capital as we have defined it. To accomplish
these goals we first review the theoretical underpinnings of and necessity for such a
model. We then present the model and consider ethical capital with four main groups of
stakeholders: employees, strategic alliance partners, customers, and communities. We
differentiate ethical capital from similar constructs, and show how our integrative model
enables operationalization of ethical capital across these different stakeholders.

Theoretical Background
Stakeholder Perceptions of Firm Trustworthiness
Many of the sources of competitive advantage a firm can have exist within
relationships between the firm and other agents (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Although
relationships grant access to additional resources and opportunities, there is also an
element of relational risk (Das & Deng, 2001) and threats of opportunism inherent in
relationships. For this reason, it is in a stakeholder’s interest to receive signals (i.e. collect
information) from firms because this will help it know what the firm is like and increase
predictability in the relationship (Das & Teng, 1998). Informal safeguards like trust and
reputation are substitutes for costly governance mechanisms (Dyer & Singh, 1998),
meaning that stakeholders are likely to prefer firms they trust and which have good
reputations.
A key component in understanding relationships between firms and stakeholders
therefore is trust. It has even been observed that "virtually every commercial transaction
has within itself an element of trust" (Arrow, 1972: 357). Trust is an extremely important
construct, but defining it has been a matter of debate in the literature. Trust has been
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described variously as a belief, attitude, behavior, etc. (Caldwell & Hansen, 2010). Trust
is developed in light of both the past and present and is also related to expectations of the
future (Heide & Miner, 1992). For purposes of this paper, we take the perspective that
trust is a psychological state (Mayer et al., 1995; ref) which necessarily also translates
into corresponding trusting behaviors or decisions (Currall & Inkpen, 2003; McEvily et
al, 2003; Caldwell & Hansen, 2010) which differ from behavior absent trust because of a
willingness to be vulnerable and to take risks (Mayer et al., 1995; ref). In this way, trust
in our view is neither only a psychological state or only a decision, but a combination of
the two (Zhong et al, 2017).
Importantly, trustworthiness is a characteristic of a trustee while trust is the
psychological state and behavior of a trustor in relation to the trustee (Dyer & Singh,
1998; ref). So, we say that a firm is trustworthy when its character and behavior warrant
trust and a stakeholder trusts a firm when it perceives that firm as trustworthy.
Accordingly, in their model of organizational trust, Mayer et al. (1995) argue that there
are three factors of trustworthiness and a trustee’s perception of each are antecedents of
trust. These factors include ability, benevolence, and integrity. Ability “is that group of
skills, competencies, and characteristics that enable a party to have influence within some
specific domain.” The benevolence factor refers to a trustor’s belief that the trustee wants
to do good to them. The integrity factor, as shared earlier, is based on the trustor’s
perception that the trustee has and adheres to principles which are acceptable. The
acceptability of the principles in the eyes of a trustor is essential (McFall, 1987; Godfrey,
2005) and will be addressed in greater detail later in the paper when we discuss moral
psychological contracts. The factor of trustworthiness at play in ethical capital theory and
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which we employ heavily in the construction of our model is the integrity factor. Simply
put, ethical capital is the collection of stakeholder perceptions of the firm’s integrity
factor of trustworthiness which are converted into relational wealth.

Assets and Goodwill
Organizations have been described as bounded collectives created to achieve
some goal (Aldrich, 2011). Goals of organizations include anything from maximizing
profits to relieving poverty. Regardless of the particular goals of a given organization,
these goals are pursued using the resources available to the organization. An
organization’s resources are called assets, which are defined by accounting standards to
be any “present economic resource controlled by the entity as a result of past events”
where an economic resource is “a right that has the potential to produce economic
benefits” (IFRS, Conceptual Framework). Assets can be either tangible or intangible.
Tangible assets have physical substance, i.e. they can be seen and touched. Examples of
tangible assets include machines, buildings, land, and inventory. Intangible assets lack
physical corporality but nevertheless are resources available to the organization for
accomplishing its goals. For example, patents, trademarks, trust, and reputation are all
intangible assets. Ethical capital is unambiguously an intangible rather than tangible
relational asset.
Assets can also be categorized as either identifiable or non-identifiable.
Identifiable assets are those which can be separated from other assets within the firm,
assigned a market value, and sold away (IFRS, IAS 38). Examples include vehicles and
equipment. Non-identifiable assets on the other hand can’t be separated and transferred
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from the firm. For example, it is impossible for a firm to extract its culture and sell or rent
it, so company culture is a non-identifiable asset. Perceptions of a firm’s trustworthiness
are clearly relationship specific and can’t be extracted from the firm and then sold on the
marketplace. For this reason, we must conclude that, in addition to being intangible,
ethical capital is a non-identifiable asset.
When organizations are purchased, the price paid can exceed the value of all the
assets and liabilities housed within the purchased firm. The amount of additional money
paid in such cases is called goodwill. In more technical terms, when one organization
acquires another, whatever portion of the purchase price that can’t be attributed to the
firm’s identifiable assets and liabilities is reported as goodwill (IFRS, IAS 3). Accounting
goodwill, then, is the collection of intangible, non-identifiable assets acquired when an
organization is purchased by another. By this definition, since ethical capital is a category
within the stock of intangible, non-identifiable assets held by a firm, it must be a
component of goodwill.

Why Call it Ethical Capital?
Ethics as a field is the philosophical study of right and wrong conduct. An ethicist
is concerned with foundational questions of human nature and interaction between
agents. Normative or prescriptive ethics studies and makes arguments about how agents
should interact with each other while behavioral or descriptive ethics studies how agents
actually do interact with each other. Attaching the label “ethical” or “moral” to a
construct, then, suggests it involves conduct of agents in relation to one or more other
agents and possibly includes reference to a normative standard of “right” conduct. We
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include the “ethical” label on our construct because it exists exclusively in firmstakeholder relationships, is influenced by the conduct of the firm, and has the
stakeholder’s moral expectations as a reference point of proper conduct. The firm is
perceived positively as a moral agent when it meets or exceeds a stakeholder’s ethical
expectations. Because ethical capital hinges on perceptions of the firm acting on desirable
moral principles, we believe calling it “ethical” capital is justified.
Ethical capital is a type of capital because it is an asset which enhances the firm’s
ability to accomplish work, it can be produced or invested in, and is “convertible”
(Bourdieu, 1985) into other forms of resources, like relational wealth. In their review of
social capital, Alder & Kwon (2002) defended using capital as a label by showing that
social capital shared specific characteristics common to other forms of capital. These
characteristics include: (1) being a long-lived asset that can be invested in and which you
can expect a future flow of benefits; (2) it is "appropriable" (Coleman, 1988) and
"convertible" (Bourdieu, 1985); (3) it can be a substitute or complement to other
resources; (4) it requires maintenance like some other capital constructs (e.g. physical
capital) do.
We follow a similar argument, maintaining that ethical capital should be seen as a
form of capital. Ethical capital is a long-term asset that won’t go away if it’s maintained
and it can be invested in. Investment includes meeting expectations, continued
interactions, marketing, philanthropy (Godfrey, 2005), etc. Any use of firm resources that
strengthens perceptions of the firm having and adhering to moral principles that
stakeholders approve of is an example of ethical capital investment. Ethical capital can be
both a substitute or compliment. It is a substitute of formal safeguards, being an informal
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safeguard (Dyer & Singh, 1997; Barney & Hansen, 1994). It complements other
resources because it makes them more valuable (e.g. acts as insurance for relational
assets; see Godfrey, 2005). Ethical capital must be maintained. Acting in a way that
signals a lack of trustworthiness will get rid of it and not maintaining perceptions by
continuing to meet expectations may cause it to erode over time. A firm can’t just get
ethical capital and then allow the relationship to deteriorate because the perception-based
equity would also disappear (Burt, 1992). Unlike some other forms of capital like
machines and land, ethical capital doesn’t depreciate when it is used to generate or
protect relational wealth.
After saying how social capital was similar to other forms of capital, Adler &
Kwon (2002) went on to argue that social capital is unlike all other forms of capital in
being "located" not in the actors but in their relations with other actors. "No one player
has exclusive ownership rights to social capital. If you or your partner in a relationship
withdraws, the connection dissolves with whatever social capital it contained" (Burt,
1992: 58). In like manner, ethical capital is not the property of a firm, but rather exists in
the firm-stakeholder relationship. Once again, this is why we argue that ethical capital is
a non-identifiable asset and is contained within goodwill.

The Idea of an Ethics Based Asset
We are far from the first authors to suggest that ethics and stakeholder perceptions
of morality are associated with economic advantages. A very robust and ongoing
conversation in the Academy is trying to understand the relationship between corporate
social responsibility and corporate financial performance.
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We find previous work on the concept of ethical or moral capital particularly
noteworthy and relevant to our paper. Some scholars have called ethical capital the extent
to which a group’s moral rules decrease transaction costs and facilitate economic
interactions within the group as well as outside the group (Ratnapala, 2003). The
existence of and adherence to moral rules within a group or relationship leads to
economic advantages. Raile (2013: 253) used the term ethical capital when arguing that
“perceptions of a positive ethical climate create an intangible reservoir that facilitates a
variety of productive interactions and outcomes.” The specific stakeholders in this study
were employees of government organizations whose perceptions of organizational ethical
climate are argued to lead to ethical capital accrual.
A thorough treatment of an ethical capital construct is found in WagnerTsukamoto (2005; 2007) which defined ethical capital as a “‘price’ a morally minded
consumer, employee, investor or other agent puts on active moral agency.” In other
words, ethical capital is identified by the premium that a stakeholder places on a firm
actively operating in a moral way. He argued that ethical capital is created when firms
address demand from stakeholders for intentional moral agency above what is required
by law. Active moral agency is defined in this argument as intentional behavior that goes
above “moral minimum standards” (i.e. the law). For example, consumers concerned
about the environmental impact of products may be willing to pay a premium for goods
that are verifiably eco-friendly beyond what is required by the law and a firm may in turn
be willing to provide such products in exchange for those premiums. Demand from
stakeholders for moral agency provides the firm with the opportunity to create ethical
capital and trade it with these stakeholders.
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Foundational to our own ethical capital model, Godfrey (2005) describes “moral
capital” as positive reputational capital generated when corporate philanthropy. The
specific example used was corporate philanthropy. Godfrey conceptualizes moral capital
as a perception-based construct that increases when stakeholders evaluate corporate
actions as being authentic and being in harmony with their own values. Moral capital is
explained as a particular form of reputational capital that arises from corporate
philanthropy and is linked to shareholder wealth. Moral capital is further described as a
signal to outsiders of an organization's “underlying moral character” that becomes a form
of insurance for relationship-based intangible assets (Godfrey, 2005). Hence, moral
capital in this paradigm is characterized by stakeholder perceptions of the firm and its
actions and involves evaluating actions as both authentic and corresponding with their
own values. It’s important to notice the relation between Godfrey (2005)’s model of
stakeholder moral evaluation of firm character and behavior and the criterion for the
integrity factor of trustworthiness (Mayer et al., 1995) of perceiving that a firm adheres to
principles the stakeholder finds acceptable.
Although extant literature has discussed ethical capital, we as an academic
community have failed to operationalize a widely useful definition of it and begin
measuring it in a wide variety of stakeholder relationships and contexts. To this point,
scholars studying ethical capital have not proposed a definition that can be
operationalized across general rather than specific cases of firm behavior. Both academic
scholarship and practitioner work (e.g. ethical investing, firm valuation) are hindered by
this gap. Part of our objective in presenting a general model of ethical capital is to
address this need by proposing a construct that lends itself to operationalization and use
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in empirically studying perceptions of ethics and relational wealth between organizations
and stakeholders. We draw on psychological contract theory (Rousseau, 1993) in making
our model to facilitate accomplishing that goal.

Moral Psychological Contracts and Signals of Firm Character
Stakeholders have a certain propensity to trust (Mayer et al., 1995). If a trustor’s
characteristics were the only determinant of trust levels, then any given stakeholder
would trust all firms equally. However, it’s clearly the case that one trustor can vary in
how much it trusts different trustees. A single trustor can hold different levels of trust
across trustees because trustees differ in perceived characteristics (Mayer et al., 1995).
Trustors form perceptions of the trustworthiness of trustees by receiving and interpreting
signals of firm characteristics.
Signaling theory studies how agents attempt to share information with principals
in a credible way. The sender (agent) sends a signal of some sort to convince the receiver
(principle) that the agent has some quality. Spence (1973) introduced the concept by
proposing a model where individuals use educational credentials as a signal to potential
employers. Employers make investment decisions under conditions of uncertainty
because they must hire candidates without knowing all their attributes. Educational
credentials are a costly but potentially valuable signal candidates can send to credibly
demonstrate desirable attributes to employers, such as productivity, intelligence, skill,
etc.
Since this introduction describing job market signals, signaling theory has been
used to study a wide range of interactions where agents convey information about
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characteristics to principals, including how firms signal their attributes to stakeholders.
Firms of course have an incentive to be evaluated positively by stakeholders. For
example, financial statements are used by firms to credibly signal attributes about assets,
liabilities, and financial health to the public. It’s also valuable to firms to be perceived by
stakeholders as trustworthy. We will argue below that firms can signal their
trustworthiness to stakeholders by meeting or exceeding moral psychological contract
expectations. Meeting moral expectations is a signal of trustworthiness and when
received and perceived as credible, signals of this sort will increase a stakeholder’s
confidence in the firm as a moral agent.
Trustors use perceived characteristics and observed behaviors of trustees to make
inferences about their trustworthiness (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). We argue
that stakeholders receive useful information about firm characteristics and behavior
through signals, that they form moral evaluations of these signals pertaining to the firm,
and that they make these evaluations through a mediating lens (Caldwell & Hansen,
2010). We acknowledge that the salience and characteristics of stakeholders as perceived
by CEO’s and managers, who generally make up the decision-making body of a firm, are
influenced by the values of those leaders (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997). Likewise, the
legitimacy of an organization (Suchman, 1995), the attention that should be given to its
actions, and the evaluation of its actions are rooted in stakeholder perceptions which
operate according to their values (Godfrey, 2005).
Within our model, we conceptualize the mediating lens as a collection of values
and unwritten expectations used as a reference when evaluating firms. The psychological
contract of a relationship is the collection of obligations perceived as implicit to the
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relationship (Rousseau, 1995; Rousseau, 1990). In other words, a stakeholder’s
psychological contract would be that stakeholder’s unwritten expectations and perceived
obligations of the firm in the relationship. Importantly, each stakeholder develops its own
idiosyncratic understanding of the obligations incumbent on the firm in the relationship,
meaning that the stakeholder and firm may not share perceptions of what those
obligations are (Rousseau, 1990; Morrison & Robinson 1997). Psychological contract
research has studied both contract fulfillment (i.e. meeting or exceeding perceived
obligations) and contract breach (i.e. failing to meet perceived obligations) and their
effects (Morrison & Robinson, 1997). For example, when an employer and employee
enter into a relationship, the employee has unwritten expectations of the organization
with respect to pay, opportunities for career advancement, etc. Should the employer meet
these expectations, the employee’s psychological contract is “fulfilled.” If the employer
fails to meet expectations, there is a “breach” of the employee psychological contract.
Fulfillment of the employee psychological contract is associated with generation of
relational wealth with employees while breach of it is associated with negative outcomes.
The psychological contracts literature has typically considered expectations
related to economic (pay, advancement, benefits) and socio-emotional (prestige,
recognition, self-esteem) rewards (MacNeil, 1985). Thompson and Bunderson (2003)
argued that, in addition to economic and socio-emotional benefits, ideological rewards
(Blau, 1964) (e.g. purpose, opportunities to contribute to a cause, etc.) can be a
component of psychological contracts between employers and employees. Stakeholder
psychological contracts, whether transactional or ideological, can be infused with
expectations about fairness, justice, and ethics. We describe such expectations held by
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stakeholders as being morally infused. Stakeholders will perceive firms as more
trustworthy and gain greater confidence in them when their morally infused expectations
are met or exceeded by the firm. When organizations meet stakeholder moral
psychological contracts, stakeholders will gain stronger perceptions of the organization’s
integrity factor of trustworthiness, meaning ethical capital will increase. On the other
hand, when organizations breach stakeholder moral psychological contracts, stakeholders
will infer lower levels for the integrity factor of trustworthiness, meaning ethical capital
decreases. Taking this perspective, the moral psychological contracts of stakeholders are
closely related to what Post et al. (2002: 9) called a corporation’s “license to operate”
which rises out of “its ability to meet the expectations of...constituencies” or
stakeholders.
The unit of analysis for psychological contracts research is typically individual
level. Within our model, individual-level stakeholders (e.g. employees or customers)
have their own psychological contact with the firm while collective-level stakeholders
(e.g. strategic partners or communities) form collective psychological contracts as groups
strategic decision makers (e.g. managers in firms, politicians or activists in communities)
form collective trust orientations (Zhong et al., 2017) and collectively held psychological
contract expectations of firms. Again, these expectations, whether individually or
collectively derived, can be fulfilled or breached by the firm. These contracts will include
moral expectations about fairness and ethics, comprising a moral psychological contract
similar to what scholars have called an ideology infused psychological contract
(Thompson & Bunderson, 2003). When firms fulfill moral psychological contract
obligations as perceived by a given stakeholder, it provides the stakeholders with
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valuable information about the firm’s characteristics, signalling the integrity factor of
trustworthiness. This is the case because integrity is the extent to which a trustee is
perceived to adhere to principles the trustor finds acceptable (Mayer et al., 1995; McFall,
1987) and those principles which a stakeholder considers acceptable are contained within
the moral psychological contract. On the other hand, when the firm breaches this contract
it also sends a signal to the stakeholder which is weakens perceptions of integrity,
generates negative ethical capital, and translates into relational liabilities rather than
relational wealth.

A General Model of Ethical Capital and Relational Wealth
Fig. 1 summarizes our model of ethical capital and relational wealth. Signals of
firm integrity (e.g. behaviors, moral reputation) are processed and evaluated by a
stakeholder subject to their values (Godfrey, 2005) and interpretation of the social
contract (Rousseau, 1995). Positive moral evaluation of the signal strengthens the
stakeholder’s perceptions of the integrity factor of trustworthiness (Mayer et al., 1995)
while negative moral evaluations weaken perceptions of firm integrity. Perceptions of the
integrity factor of trustworthiness are an antecedent of trust (Mayer et al., 1995), meaning
that strengthened perceptions are associated with increased stakeholder trust and
weakened perceptions are associated with decreased stakeholder trust. Stakeholder trust
is manifested in high-value stakeholder behaviors (Caldwell & Hansen, 2010) while lack
of it is manifested in value reducing behaviors. In addition to this indirect effect of ethical
capital on relational wealth via stakeholder trust, there is also a direct effect. Ethical
capital itself affects relational wealth in one of two main ways: (1) by increasing levels of
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relational wealth, and (2) by influencing the current stock of relational wealth. Ethical
capital increases absolute levels of relational wealth and negative ethical capital
decreases absolute levels because the constituent perceptions held by stakeholders that
give. Ethical capital can influence current stocks of relational wealth either by acting like
a form of insurance (Godfrey, 2005) protecting it against potential future damage or by
increasing the productivity and value of current relational assets. It’s important to note
that negative ethical capital can in like manner affect current stocks of relational wealth
in two ways. One way is by creating a [reputational] liability that functions opposite to
insurance, making relational wealth more fragile. Negative ethical capital can also make
current relational assets less productive and valuable.

Figure 1. A General Model of Firm Signals, Ethical Capital, and Relational Wealth
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Whenever a new definition or construct is proposed, it’s essential to provide a
rationale for the new conceptualization. In addition, a new construct must be sufficiently
differentiated from extant constructs to have any conceptual utility beyond what the
literature already uses. The primary constructs we anticipate will seem conceptually
similar to ethical capital and which need to be differentiated are social capital (Alder &
Kwon, 2002; ref) and reputational capital (Fombrun, 1995; ref). Our purpose here is not
to provide an exhaustive review of each of these constructs. Rather, we briefly discuss the
essence of reputational and social capital to demonstrate that ethical capital is not
logically equivalent to either of them, though intrinsically related to both of them.
Social capital is “the resource available to actors as a function of their location in
the structure of their social relations” (Alder & Kwon, 2002, pg. 18). This form of
intangible capital is rooted in relationships or networks which enable members to work
toward collective goals (Brehm & Rahn, 1997) and gives members access to one
another’s resources (Knoke, 1999; Adler & Kwon, 2002). The fundamental notion of
social capital lies in this proposition: the goodwill of others toward an actor are a
resource which can be advantageously converted into other resources (Alder & Kwon,
2002; Dore, 1983).
Reputational capital, as its name suggests, represents a resource that provides
advantages to a firm based upon its reputation. It is an intangible asset that some have
related to brand equity and goodwill (Fombrun, 1995) that establishes a firm within its
environment (Worden, 2003). Reputational capital is based on perceptions of the firm
held by its observers (Suh & Amine, 2007). Basically, the idea of reputational capital is
that a firm’s reputation is an asset which can be converted into wealth.

18

Our argument for differentiating ethical capital from reputational and social
capital is simple and straightforward. Following a distinction made by Dyer & Singh
(1998), reputation is an informal safeguard rooted in indirect experience of a firm while
trust is an informal safeguard rooted in direct experience of the firm. A reputation of
trustworthiness is a signal to observers of trustworthiness (Barney & Hansen, 1994) that
can shape perceptions of trustworthiness, but this indirect experience with the firm is
different from the direct experience with the firm associated with goodwill trust (Dyer &
Singh, 1998).
As a stakeholder receives signals about a firm, those signals are measured against
stakeholder expectations and values and are used to continuously refine perceptions.
Direct experience with a firm of course affects ethical capital because it’s a proximal
signal of the firm’s character. Indirect, reputation-based experience can also influence
ethical capital because firms operate within a network of stakeholders, not just dyadic
relationships with individual stakeholders (Rowley, 1997). When a firm interacts with
one stakeholder in a positive or negative way and this information reaches another
stakeholder, the latter stakeholder will use this information to refine its perceptions of the
firm’s character and ethical capital will be affected via reputation. Again, the evaluation
of this information will be based on the observing stakeholder’s beliefs about what
constitutes morally acceptable behavior. For this reason, the reputation a firm has can be
a signal leading to positive ethical capital with some stakeholders while creating negative
ethical capital with others (Godrey, 2005).
In summary, stakeholder perceptions of a firm’s underlying moral character
which constitute ethical capital are formed through both indirect and direct experience
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with the firm. Social capital is premised on direct experience with another party and need
not always involve the integrity factor of trustworthiness. Reputational capital is
associated with indirect experience of the firm and can arise from broader types of
reputation other than a reputation with a decidedly moral dimension. Ethical capital is a
subset of both reputational capital and social capital, with the nature (indirect or direct) of
the signal affecting perceptions of the firm being what differentiates the category (see Fig
2.)
In Table 1. we give the reader a non-exhaustive list of constructs similar to
ethical capital and their definitions along with sources. Inspection of and comparison
with each of these definitions reveals that our ethical capital construct is distinct.
Notwithstanding prima facie similarities between ethical capital and other intangible
constructs, ethical capital is unique, being either an antecedent of (e.g. trust), subset of
(e.g. reputational and social capital), or manifestation of (e.g. ethical and moral capital)
these other concepts.
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Table 1. Ethical Capital and Similar Extant Constructs with Definitions
Construct

Definition

"the collection of stakeholder perceptions relating to a firm’s
Ethical Capital underlying moral character which can be converted into
relational wealth"
Trust

Social Capital

This paper

"the mutual confidence that no party to an exchange will exploit
another's vulnerabilities."

Sabel, 1993:1133

"the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of
another party based on the expectation that the other will
perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective
of the ability to monitor or control that other party"

Mayer et al., 1995:712

"the relinquishing of one's personal control or power to another
in the expectant hope that the other party will honor a duty or
social contract inherent in the relationship"

Cadwell & Hansen, 2010;
Cadwell et al., 2009

"the ability of people to work together for common purposes in
groups and organizations"

Fukuyama, 1995:10

"the process by which social actors create and mobilize their
network connections within and between organizations to gain
access to other social actors' resources"

Knoke,1999:18

"the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership
in social networks or other social structures"

Portes,1998:6

"the goodwill available to individuals or groups. Its source lies
in the structure and content of the actor's social relations. Its
effects flow from the information, influence, and solidarity it
makes available to the actor."
Reputation

Source

"a form of intangible wealth that is closely related to what
accountants call goodwill and marketers term brand equity"

"a fragile resource that situates the organization in its
environment"
Ethical Capital "the 'price' a morally minded consumer, employee, investor,

Adler & Kwon, 2002:23

Fombrun,1996

Worden, 2003
Wagner-Tsukamoto, 2005

or other agent puts on active moral agency"
"an economic advantage that results from the objective
prevalence of the observance of certain moral rules"
Philanthropic
Moral
Reputational
Capital

"represents the outcome of the process of assessment,
evaluation, and imputation by stakeholders and communities
of a firm's philanthropic activities" and "provides the firm with
insurance-like protection for its relationship based assets"
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Ratnapala, 2003

Godfrey, 2005

Ethical Capital Across Stakeholders and an Operationalization Strategy
Below we describe ethical capital between the firm and four main types of
stakeholders: employees, strategic alliance partners, customers, and communities.

Ethical Capital with Employees
Employee’s affective commitment (Meyer et al., 1997) is a form of relational
wealth (Godfrey, 2005; Business Ethics Quarterly, 2002) which increases when
employees perceive the ethical climate of their organization as a benevolence one (Cullen
& Victor, 1993). It represents a form of relational wealth because organizational
citizenship, which is associated with high-value behaviors (Organ, 1988), is born from a
high level of commitment. This commitment is based on perceptions of the fairness of
leaders (Husted & Folger, 2004). On the other hand, perceptions of an egoistic ethical
climate reduce employee affective commitment (Cullen & Victor, 1993) and we expect
self-interest protecting/value destroying behaviors when employees don’t trust their
leaders. These behaviors bring increases in transaction costs and formal safeguards
(Caldwell & Hansen, 2010; Poppo & Zenger, 2002).
We argue that as employees receive signals about the integrity of the company
they work for (e.g. signals of leader integrity) they will develop stronger or weaker
perceptions of the firm’s integrity. In other words, positive or negative ethical capital will
accrue between the firm and employees as employees receive and evaluate these signals.
Ethical capital with employees can be converted into valuable forms of relational wealth
such as organizational commitment, retention, or organizational citizenship.
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Ethical Capital in Strategic Alliances
In their Relational View of the Firm, Dyer & Singh (1998) argued that
interorganizational relationships are key to understanding competitive advantage and
proposed four possible sources of competitive advantage arising from these relationships.
One of the proposed sources was effective governance, which they divided into two
types: third-party enforcement and self-enforcement. Within the latter class of
governance, they included informal safeguards, of which trust within the
interorganizational relationship is one example. Other strategy scholars have also argued
that trustworthiness is a source of competitive advantage (Barney & Hansen, 1994).
Interorganizational trust involves an organization’s strategic decision makers
holding a collective trust orientation toward another firm (Dyer & Singh, 1998: 669;
Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998; Zhong et al., 2017). Collective trust orientations held
by a stakeholder group of strategic decision makers toward a firm are distinct from
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interpersonal trust between boundary spanning members of these organizations (Zhong et
al., 2017).
Trust in interfirm relationships increases mutually beneficial behavior (Madhock,
1995). We argue that interorganizational trust in the firm held by strategic alliance
partners is associated with relational wealth because it will lead to high value trusting
behaviors (Caldwell & Hansen, 2010) and will insure intangible resources in the interfirm
relationship (Godfrey, 2005).

Ethical Capital with Customers
Naturally, all else equal, consumers will prefer to do business with firms and
brands they trust and perceive as having and acting on acceptable values. Recent research
has found a positive direct effect of customer perceived ethicality of a brand on brand
equity as well as an indirect effect on brand equity through the mediator of brand image
( (Iglesias et al., 2019; Sierra et al., 2017). We argue that customers can gain stronger or
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weaker perceptions of brand ethicality and these perceptions can be thought of as positive
or negative ethical capital with consumers which are converted into relational wealth (e.g.
brand equity) or relational liabilities (e.g. reductions in brand equity), respectively.

Ethical Capital with Communities
“Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity
are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms,
values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995: 574). Organizational legitimacy
(Suchman, 1995) therefore is the sociological concept of how desirable, proper, or
appropriate an organization is perceived to be by the communities in which they exist and
has been called a form of relational wealth (Godfrey, 2005; Business Ethics Quarterly,
2002). One component of general organizational legitimacy laid out by Suchman (1995:
579) was moral legitimacy which “reflects a positive normative evaluation of the
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organization and its activities” (e.g., Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Parsons, 1960). It “rests not
on judgments about whether a given activity benefits the evaluator, but rather on
judgments about whether the activity is "the right thing to do."” (Suchman, 1995: 579). A
measure has been developed and validated which measures individual perceptions of
organizational moral legitimacy (Alexiou & Wiggins, 2018). We argue that community
held perceptions of firm integrity will increase the moral legitimacy that firm holds
within the community. As an antecedent, this increased moral legitimacy will increase
general organizational legitimacy which is a valuable form of relational wealth the firm
can hold with community stakeholders.

Operationalization and Measurement of Ethical Capital
As shown in Table 2., measures already exist in the academic literature for the
various stakeholder perceptions we have described. An operationalization strategy of
ethical capital as we have defined it would involve using these extant measures to collect
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data on the perceptions that employees, consumers, partners, and communities have of a
focal firm.
Table 2. Ethical Capital and Relational Wealth Across Stakeholders and Extant Measures
Stakeholder
Employees

Ethical Capital

Measure

Perceptions of positive Ethical Climate Index (Arnaud,
ethical climate
2010)

Relational Wealth
Organizational commitment
and trusting behaviors

Perceptions of positive
ethical culture
Ethical Culture Audit (Trevino &
Weaver, 2003)
Perceptions of leader
trustworthiness
Strategic
Alliance
Partners

Perceptions of firm
trustworthiness

Customers

Perceived brand
ethicality

Integrity Factor of Trustworthiness
(Meyer et al., 1995)
Collective trust orientation
and trusting behaviors
Integrity Factor of Trustworthiness
(Meyer et al., 1995) as reported by
collective of strategic decision
makers
Brand equity and trusting
behaviors
Customer Perceived Ethicality
(Iglesias et al., 2019)

Communities Perceptions of morally
desirable traits
Individual Perceptions of Moral
Legitimacy (Alexiou & Wiggins,
2018)

Moral legitimacy and
trusting behaviors

Conclusion
We have drawn upon and synthesized extant theory to construct an integrated
model of ethical capital in which stakeholder perceptions of a firm’s underlying moral
character formed by evaluating relevant signals (e.g. reputation, behavior) about the firm
in light of a moral psychological contract are a relational asset associated with high-value
stakeholder behaviors and insurance of intangible relational wealth (Godfrey, 2005). We
have outlined a strategy for operationalizing ethical capital with various stakeholders that
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draws heavily on prior empirical work. Future research will involve development of
measures for the components of our model which don’t yet have measures in the
literature. Future work will operationalize ethical capital for productive use in both
academic scholarship and ethical investment decision making.

28

References
Adler, P. S., & Kwon, S. W. (2002). Social capital: Prospects for a new concept.
Academy of management review, 27(1), 17-40.
Aldrich, H., & Ruef, M. (2011). Organizations Evolving. London: SAGE.
Alexiou, K., & Wiggins, J. (2018). Measuring individual legitimacy perceptions: Scale
development and validation. Strategic Organization, 17(4), 470-496.
Arnaud, A. (2010) Conceptualizing and Measuring Ethical Work Climate: Development
and Validation of the Ethical Climate Index. Business & Society, Vol. 49, Issue 2.
Barney, J., & Hansen, M. (1994). Trustworthiness as a Source of Competitive Advantage.
Strategic Management Journal, 15(S1), 175-190.
Blau, P. M. 1964. Exchange and power in social life. New York: Wiley
Bourdieu, P. 1985. The forms of capital. In J. G. Richardson (Ed.), Handbook of theory
and research for the sociology of education: 241-258. New York: Greenwood.
Brehm, J., & Rahn, W. (1997). Individual-level evidence for the causes and consequences
of social capital. American journal of political science, 999-1023.
Caldwell, C., & Hansen, M. (2010). Trustworthiness, Governance, and Wealth Creation.
Journal Of Business Ethics, 97(2), 173-188.
Currall, S. C., & Inkpen, A. 2002. A multilevel approach to trust in joint ventures.
Journal of International Business Studies, 33: 479-495.
De Jong, B. A., & Elfring, T. 2010. How does trust affect the performance of ongoing
teams? Academy of Management Journal, 53: 535-549.

29

Dore, R. (1983). Goodwill and the Spirit of Market Capitalism. The British Journal Of
Sociology, 34(4), 459.
Dyer, J., & Singh, H. (1998). The Relational View: Cooperative Strategy and Sources of
Interorganizational Competitive Advantage. The Academy Of Management Review,
23(4), 660. doi: 10.2307/259056
Fombrun, C. J. (1995). Reputation: Realizing value from the corporate image.
Fulmer, C. A., & Gelfand, M. J. 2012. At what level (and in whom) we trust: Trust across
multiple organizational levels. Journal of Management, 38: 1167-1230.
Godfrey, P. C. (2005). The relationship between corporate philanthropy and shareholder
wealth: A risk management perspective. Academy of management review, 30(4), 777798.
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) Accounting standards. Retrieved
from www.ifrs.org
Heide, J. B., & Miner, A. S. 1992. The shadow of the future. Academy of Management
Journal, 35: 265-291.
Knoke, D. (1999). Organizational networks and corporate social capital. In Corporate
social capital and liability (pp. 17-42). Springer, Boston, MA.
Macneil, I. R. 1985. Relational contract: What we do and do not know. Wisconsin Law
Review, 1985: 483-525.
Madhok, A. 1995, Revisiting multinational firms' tolerance for joint ventures: A trustbased approach. Journal of International Business Studies, 26: 117-137
Mayer, R. C., Davis, J. H., & Schoorman, F. D. 1995. An integrative model of
organizational trust. Academy of Management Review, 20: 709-734.

30

McEvily, B., Perrone, V., & Zaheer, A. 2003. Trust as an organizing principle.
Organization Science, 14: 91-103.
McFall, L. 1987. Integrity. Ethics, 98: 5-20.
Morrison, E. W., & Robinson, S. L. 1997. When employees feel betrayed: A model of
how psychological contract violation develops. Academy of Management Review, 22:
226-256.
Meyer, J. P., & Allen, N. J. 1997. Commitment in the workplace: Theory, research, and
application. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Post et al., 2002 Redefining the Corporation: Stakeholder Management and
Organizational Wealth
Raile, E. D. (2013). Building ethical capital: Perceptions of ethical climate in the public
sector. Public Administration Review, 73(2), 253-262.
Ratnapala, S. (2003). Moral capital and commercial society. The Independent Review,
8(2), 213-233.
Rousseau, D. M. 1990. New hire perceptions of their own and their employer's
obligations: A study of psychological contracts. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 11:
389- 400
Rousseau, D. M., & McLean Parks, J. 1993. The contracts of individuals and
organizations. Research in Organizational Behavior, 15: 1-47
Rousseau, D. M. 1995. Psychological contracts in organizations: Understanding written
and unwritten agreements. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Rowley, T. (1997). Moving beyond Dyadic Ties: A Network Theory of Stakeholder
Influences. The Academy Of Management Review, 22(4), 887.

31

Spence, M. (1973). Job Market Signaling. The Quarterly Journal Of Economics, 87(3),
355.
Suh, T., & Amine, L. S. (2002). Defining and managing corporate reputational capital in
global markets: Conceptual issues, analytical frameworks, and managerial implications.
In American Marketing Association. Conference Proceedings(Vol. 13, p. 5). American
Marketing Association.
Thompson, J., & Bunderson, J. (2003). Violations of Principle: Ideological Currency in
the Psychological Contract. The Academy Of Management Review, 28(4), 571.
Treviño, L., & Weaver, G. (2003). Managing ethics in business organizations. Stanford:
Stanford business Books.
Wagner-Tsukamoto, S. (2005). An Economic Approach to Business Ethics: Moral
Agency of the Firm and the Enabling and Constraining Effects of Economic Institutions
and Interactions in a Market Economy. Journal Of Business Ethics, 60(1), 75-89.
Williamson, O. E. 1991b. Strategizing, economizing, and eco- 141-159.
Worden, S. (2003). The role of integrity as a mediator in strategic leadership: A recipe for
reputational capital. Journal of Business Ethics, 46(1), 31-44.
Zaheer, A., McEvily, B., & Perrone, V. 1998. Does trust matter? Exploring the effects of
interorganizational and interpersonal trust on performance. Organization Science
Zhong, W., Su, C., Peng, J., & Yang, Z. (2017). Trust in Interorganizational
Relationships: A Meta-Analytical Integration. Journal Of Management, 43(4), 10501075.

32

